

E. # 1164

Doc. No. 2593-D (7)

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Item No. 8

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

725 (Part 1 of 3)

^a
Concerning my #722 .

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 b and 727 b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

a - S.I.S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

b - Not available.

SECRET

24330

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this--to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever breaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24331

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end--at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations--the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go away, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24332

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

秘

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(0A)(至急)

第七二五號(三ノ第一秘)

往電第七二二號(註a)ニ據シテ

一 惣テ、日米關係ハ其ノ破綻ニ類シ、吾國民ハ國
交調整ノ可能性ニ信ヲ置カザル様ニナリツツア
リ。國策ノ根本方針ヲ審議スル爲、内閣ハ連日
大本營退縮會議ヲ繼續シ熟議ニ熟議ヲ重ネタル
結果茲ニ政府及軍最高司令部一致ノ意見ニ基キ
日米交渉再開ニ對スル反對提案ヲ擧起シ得ルニ
至レリ(第七二六號ノ註b/及第七二七號ノ註
b/ト參ク)。本政策並ニ帝國ノ他ノ諸政策ニ
就テハ、五日午前開會豫定ナル會議ノ確認ヲ待
ツモノナリ。

二 吾ガ帝國内外ノ事態ハ極メテ急迫ヲ告ゲ今ヤ延
期ヲ許サザル狀勢ニアルモ、日本帝國ト合衆國
トノ平和的友好關係ヲ維持セントスル誠意ヨリ
熟議ノ結果、今一度交渉繼續ヲ冀ス事ニ決セリ。

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2.

但本交渉ハ吾々最後ノ試ニシテ、名實共ニ此ノ
反對提案ハ、實ニ最後案ナリト御承知アリ度ク
此ヲ以テシテ尙急速安結ニ到ラザルニ於テハ、
遺憾ナガラ會談ハ決然ニ到ルノ外ナク、其ノ結
果兩國友好關係ハ實ニ渾沌ノ縁ニ墮ムノ已ムナ
キニ至ルモノナリ。即チ今次討衝ノ成否ハ帝國
國運ニ至大ナル影響アリ。實際、吾々ハ此ノ設
子ノ一擲ニ吾ガ國土ノ運命ヲ賭セル次第ナリ。

註 a、日米關係改善ノ爲ノ根本方針考研ノ爲、大本
營トノ間ニ會合開催サルベキ旨及最後の決定
ハ五日午前ナサレル旨ヲ述べタル S・I・S
第二四二九二號ヲ指ス。

ト入手シ得ズ。

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(0A)(至急)

第七二五號(三ノ第二部)

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日米會議開始ノ際、誰レカ其會議ノ新ク永引クラ夢想セン。吾々ハ急速安結ヲ計ル爲、從來難キヲ忍ビテ讓歩ニ讓歩ヲ重ネ來リタルニ抑ラズ、合衆國ハ之ニ響應スル所ナク、終始當初ノ提案ヲ固執シ居ル現狀ニシテ我萬朝野ニモ米國ノ誠意ニ疑惑ヲ感ズルモノ尠ラザル議ナリ。我政府ハ凡ユル種類ノ願望的事ヲ忍ビ飽迄誠意ヲ披歴シテ更ニ讓歩ヲ許テセリ。然リ彼等ニ對シ屈服スル迄ニ讓歩セリ。其ノ所以ノモノハ一ニ太平洋ノ平和維持ヲ顧念スルニ出ヅルモノニシテ米側一部ニ於テハ吾萬ガ一萬的讓歩ヲナサント欲セルガ如ク考ヘルモノアル如ク見ユルモ、吾々ハ自國ハ弱氣ニ發スルニ非ズ、從ツテ吾萬ノ隱忍ニモ自ラ限度アリ、吾々ノ左立ト權威トハ必要ニヨリテハ犧牲ノ如何ヲ問ハズ擁護セザルベカラザル次第ニシテ、合衆國ニシテ此ノ上吾國ノ立場ヲ無視シ、又ハ之ヲ避クルガ如キ態度ニ出ズルニ於テハ、交渉ヲ開始スルモ何等益ナキニシテ今ヤ

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Sten 8

4

吾々ハ能フ限リノ友誼的精神ヲ發揮シ進デ能フ限リ
ノ讓歩ヲナシ以テ局面ノ平和的收拾ヲ計ラント欲ス
ルモノナリ。

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5.

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九四一年十一月四日

紫(0A) (至急)

第七二五號 (三ノ第三部)

- 三 最後ノ日、即チ日米交渉ノ最後ノ日ニハ如何ナル事象ノ生ズルカニ思フ致シ合衆國政府ニ於テハ吾万ト和平ヲ結ブコトノ如何ニ有效ナルヤヲ又之ガ全世界ノ情勢ニ如何程良キカラ眞剣ニ考察サレル様衷心ヨリ要望スルヤ切ナリ。
- 四 如上ノ次第ニテ貴大使ノ使命ノ如何ニ重大ナルカラ御承知セラレシ事ナラン。貴使へ問題解決ノ鍵ヲ握ル重要ナル地位ニアリ、吾々ハ、吾ガ帝國國運進展ノ爲何事カ有效ナル事ヲ貴使ガナシ得ラルベシト大ナル希望ヲ賜シテ居ル次第ナリ。此上共右諸點寫ト御諒承ノ上沈着以テ改善ヲ盡シテ御努力ヲ、繼續スル決意ヲ致サレ度シ余ハ、貴下ガ然致サレンコトヲ希望スルモノナリ。勿、會議終了次第其ノ旨貴方ニ通報致スベキニ付、其ノ上貴方ニ於テハ「ハルーズベルト」大統領及ビ「ハル」國務長官ト會見シ我方ノ決意ヲ徹底セシメ極力交渉ノ急遽妥結ヲ計ラルル

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6.

様御努アリ度シ。

五

是等會談ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ、實地ノ折衝ト並行シ
余モ亦當地ニ於テ接觸スベシ。

余ハ在京米國大使ト會談ヲ行フ豫定ニ付、貴使ニ
於テハ米國官邊トノ會談ニヨリテ其ノ意見ノ趨
勢ヲ得次第當万ニ電報アリ度ク今後ノ交渉經過
ハ勿論貴万ニ於テ新ナル措置ヲ取ル際ハ逐一報
告ノ上連絡ヲトラレ度シ。右様ノ關係上手違ヒ
ヲ避ケル爲ニモ當万訓令ハ飽クマデ嚴守アリ度
當万訓令ハ貴万ニ於テ取捨選擇ノ餘地ナキコト
ト御承知アリ度シ。

Doc. 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリウ・クラーク

EX # 1165

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Item No. 9

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistence as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement. "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24334

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

726

(Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.
We are toning down our stipulations in this connection
as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China
since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will
be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and
on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between
Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a
suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried
out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established.
In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out
within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities
question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely
that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French
Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial
integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that
a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought
to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched
to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid
having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached
between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an
understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24335

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24337

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc 2593D (8)

1. ex 1165

甲案

東京
ワシントン宛

和

一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月四日

紫色 (CA) (至急)

第七二六號 (四ノ第一部)

一 本案ハ九月二十五日ノ我方提案ヲ既往ノ交渉経過ヨリ判断セル米國側ノ希望ニ出不得ル限リ「ミート」スル趣旨ヲ以テ修正セル最後案ニシテ我方主張ヲ左記ノ通り緩和セルモノナリ。

(一) 通商無差別問題

九月二十五日案ニテ到底妥結ノ見込ナキ際ハ、「日本國政府ハ無差別原則カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域即チ支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス」ヲ導入ス。

(二) 三国同盟ノ解釋及履行問題

我方ニ於テ自衛權ノ範圍ヲ擴大スル意圖ナキコトヲ更ニ明瞭ニスルト共ニ、從來屢々説明セル如ク我方ハ歐州戦争ノ太平洋ヘノ擴大ヲ避ケ展キ希望ナル旨ヲ鮮明サレ度シ。

東京發華盛頓宛

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (OA) (至急)

第七二六號

(四ノ第二部)

(三) 撤兵問題
本件へ左ノ通り緩和ス、

(A) 支那事變勃發以來中國ニ於ケル駐兵及ビ撤兵

中國ニ派遣セラレタル日本國軍隊ハ華北、蒙疆地域及海南島ニ關シテハ日華間平和成立後ニ、駐屯シ、適當期間ヲ經過スル迄撤退セザルベク、爾餘ノ軍隊ノ撤退ハ平和成立ト同時ニ日本及ビ中國ニヨリ實行セラルベシ。治安維持ノ爲、二箇年以内ニ實行セラルベシ。

(註「適當期間」ニ付米國當局ヨリ質問アリタル場合ハ、概ネ二十五年ヲ目途トスルモノナル旨ヲ以テ漠然ト應酬スルモノトス)

(B) 佛印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

日本國政府ハ佛領印度支那ノ領土主權ヲ尊重ス、現ニ佛領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本國軍隊ハ、公正ナル平和ノ確立スルカ、

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Item 9

2.

又ハ支那事變ニシテ解決スルニ於テハ之ヲ
撤去スベシ。

- (四) 原則トシテハ之ヲ日米間ノ正式妥結事項(了
済)タルト又ハ其ノ他ノ妥結タルトラ問ヘズ、
中ニ包含セシムルコトハ極力回避スルモノト
ス。

和

東京發「ワシントン」宛一九四二年十一月四日

衆参(CA)

(至急)

第七二六號

(四ノ三部)

二、説 明

- (I) 通商無差別原則ニ付テハ、勿論地理的近接
ノ問題アルモ我方ハ從來、此ノ線ニ沿フ主
張ヘ之ヲ訂正シ、無差別原則問題ヲ世界的
差違ニ置キタルモノナルガ、米政府発書中
ニ何レカノ國ガ特定地域内ニ於テ所定ノ政
策ヲ取リ、他ノ一方ガ別ノ特定地域内ニ於
テ補足的政策ヲ採ルコトハ實行シ易キコト
ナルベシトノ趣旨ノ記述アリ。右ニ従スル
モ何等反對ナカルヘク、從ツテ本件ニ付テ
ハ之ニテ容易ニ合意成立スルモノト信ズ。

- (2) 三國同盟ノ問題ニ付テハ屢次貴電ニ依レバ

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Sten 9

米軍側へ我方提案ニテ大体満足シ居ルヤノ
趣ナルニ付目録欄ノ解釋ヲ送ニ遺大スル意
圖ナキコトヲ一層明確ニスルニ於テハ、本
件モ妥結ヲ見ルベキモノト信ズ。

秘

東京發事歴頃宛

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (CA)

(至急)

第七二六號

(四ノ第四部)

(三) 撤兵問題へ或ハ最も困難ナル點トナルヤモ知
レサルモ、我方ハ米側ガ不決定地域ヘノ我方
駐兵ニ強ク反戦スルニ望ミ、占領地域ヲ我ヘ
官吏ノ異動ヲナシ、以テ其ノ疑惑ヲ解カント
スルモノナリ。

我方ハ之ヲ撤兵ト稱ス。駐兵ヲ延前トスルヨ
リハ例外トスル方米側ノ希望ニ副フベキモ、
結局ノ所此ハ問題トナラザルベシ。駐兵期間
ニ關シテハ、明確ナル聲明ヲ發見サレタル際
ハ、從來當ニ廢除ナル言辭ヲ以テ表ヘシ來リ
タル所貴使ニ於テハ固未得ル限り不徹底ニシ
テ然モ快適ナ言辭ニテ婉曲ニ述べ、無期限駐
兵ハ永久駐兵ニ非ル旨ヲ印象ツケル様御努力

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Jan 7

相成度シ。之ヲ要スルニ、甲案ハ他ノ提案テ
通ヘラレタル三案中ノ二案ニ關シテハ全面的
ニ米側主張ヲ受諾セルモノニテ、最後ノ一端
タル駐兵及ヒ撤兵問題ニ付テモ最大限ノ讓歩
ヲ爲セル次第ナリ。吾々ハ實ニ四年ノ間中國
ニ於テ一心ニ戰ヒ來リ、盡大ナル犠牲ヲ拂ヒ
タリ。
彼等又之ヲ承知セリ、然レバ此ニ關連スル彼
等ノ主張ハ單ナル「長望スル意見」ナリシナ
ルベシ。兎モ角此ノ點ニ關シ之以上ノ讓歩ハ
國內的ニ不可能ナリ。彼等精々御努力ノ上米
側ヲシテ右ヲ諒解セシメ起ニ交渉妥結ニ導ク
様切望ス

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

ワシントン、二十五、D.O.

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ

添附紙通ノ日本文電報ノ複製寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ッ
テ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ機譯セラレシモノ
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻
譯スル爲メニ洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダズリユール・クラーク